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Introduction
The editorial by Stein et al. (2010) is timely and
relevant given the development of DSM-V and the
likely impact that such a development will have on
mental health services in the USA. The revision of the
DSM will also aﬀect international psychiatric research
and global practice thanks to the interplay between the
development of DSM and ICD (Fulford & Sartorius,
2009). The editorial by Stein and colleagues is very rich
and there are many themes suitable for further exam-
ination and discussion. For this response, however,
we have chosen to focus on two themes: the use of the
term ‘mental ’ and the idea of psychiatric disorders
being ‘ in ’ an individual.
Mental or psychiatric disorders?
Although Stein and colleagues are right that, in the
Cartesian philosophical tradition, the term ‘mental ’
has been contrasted to ‘physical ’ in accounts where
the mental is characterized by immaterial thought
(res cogitans) and the physical by extension (res ex-
tensa), the term ‘mental ’ by itself does not commit
people who use it to either substance or property du-
alism. In other words, it does not commit people to the
view that the mind and the brain are necessarily two
diﬀerent kinds of substances or to the view that mental
and physical properties are necessarily two diﬀerent
kinds of properties. In fact, one might be a physicalist,
a philosopher who believes that everything in nature
is physical, and still use a mental vocabulary compe-
tently and meaningfully. The retention of a mental
vocabulary does not undermine one’s commitment to
physicalism.
In particular, the use of ‘mental ’ is useful in con-
temporary psychiatric research as it denotes events or
states characterized by intentionality, such as beliefs
and desires, and capacities that are amenable to be
assessed on the basis of normative standards, such as
the standards of rationality and justiﬁcation. One of
the claims that we might want to explore with respect
to the classiﬁcation and diagnosis of mental disorders
is, for instance, the extent to which behaviour is patho-
logical when people’s beliefs violate norms of ration-
ality or people lack self-knowledge. Together with
other colleagues, we have explored the importance
of normative notions in psychiatry, particularly in re-
lation to delusions and psychosis, and hence we
would support the retention of a mental vocabulary
when thinking about certain aspects of psychiatric
disorders (Bortolotti & Broome, 2008, 2009 ; Broome &
Bortolotti, 2009a ; Broome et al., in press).
Although well-motivated, the authors’ decision
to turn to phrases such as ‘mental/psychiatric ’ and
‘brain/mind’ seemed, on the whole, unnecessary and
a little unwieldy. Recognizing the distinctiveness and
usefulness of the mental vocabulary does not commit
anyone to the existence of Cartesian spooky, im-
material stuﬀ. That said, there is nothing objectionable
in the use of the phrase ‘psychiatric disorder ’, unless it
is regarded as circular or trivial in some contexts.
To refer to a disorder as a psychiatric disorder may
not commit anyone to a theory about the nature of
the disorder but may not always be informative, as in
some context it is likely to be understood as applicable
to a disorder when this is ‘diagnosed as such by a
psychiatrist ’, or when it ‘ falls under the remit of the
practice of psychiatry ’.
Perhaps Stein and colleagues would be sympathetic
to using the term ‘psychological ’ instead of ‘mental ’
in some of the relevant occurrences? That is, not
necessarily when identifying a disorder but when de-
scribing some of the features of that disorder. The term
* Address for correspondence : Dr M. Broome, Room B-156,
Health Sciences Research Institute, Warwick Medical School,
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
(Email : m.r.broome@warwick.ac.uk)
Psychological Medicine (2010), 40, 1783–1785. f Cambridge University Press 2010
doi:10.1017/S0033291709992352
COMMENTARY
‘psychological ’ has no dualist connotation whatsoever
and reminds us that, in everyday life and also in re-
search and clinical practice in psychiatry, we do not
always identify and describe behaviours (including
actions, speech, beliefs, intentions, emotions) in phy-
sical terms, although we are fully aware that such be-
haviours have physical bases and causes (Broome &
Bortolotti, 2009b). The use of the term ‘psychological ’
also avoids some potential challenges of circularity or
triviality that the use of the term ‘psychiatric ’ would
generate in some contexts.
Is the disorder in the individual or in the space
between individuals?
The discussion of the phrase ‘ in an individual ’ by
Stein et al. is extremely interesting but brief, given the
complexity surrounding this issue. Although it may
seem self-evident that disorders reside in a given in-
dividual, when examined closely the claim is contro-
versial and carries conceptual baggage. What does it
mean to claim that ‘a psychiatric illness lies in the in-
dividual ’? There can be at least two interpretations of
such a statement. The ﬁrst interpretation invites an
exploration of the metaphysics of psychiatric illness.
It suggests that we can compare, for illustrative pur-
poses, some psychiatric disorders to lesions that seem
to occur within an individual and to aﬀect the in-
dividual’s well-being independent of the existence of
other individuals, or independent of the external en-
vironment. Such an exercise might have important
implications for our future understanding of psychi-
atric illness.
The second interpretation would lead us to believe
that Stein and colleagues intend to discuss the locus of
psychiatric disorders. It is not at all obvious that the
aetiology or the pathological nature of a psychiatric
disorder can be all contained in the individual and
explained by reference to properties of the individual.
It is not clear that any condition that is regarded as a
psychiatric disorder is such that it has no external
(environmental or social) causes. Furthermore, it is not
clear that something can be regarded as a psychiatric
disorder if it is dysfunctional or disabling for an indi-
vidual independent of the individual’s environment
or social context. To insist on an internalist position,
regarding either the causes of psychiatric disorders or
the reasons for their being pathological as internal to
the subject, would bring back a form of ‘mentalism’, to
which the authors would certainly be opposed.
A further point is this : could a solipsist be mentally
ill? Could a person’s psychiatric illness ever be spot-
ted in the absence of a third person observing his/her
behaviour within a shared environment, ascribing to
his/her mental states, and making judgements about
the appropriateness or rationality of those states and
of his/her behaviour in general? On these three
points, the anatomy and locus of a disorder, the causal
history and impact of a disorder, and the detection of a
disorder, we suggest that at the very least the claim
that a disorder occurs ‘ in an individual ’ warrants
further examination. Without further examination, it
potentially allows a form of internalism to ﬂourish in
psychiatry and leads to neglect of the role of the world,
society and other individuals in the understanding of
a person’s mental illness.
Conclusions
We have only had space to comment upon two issues
raised by Stein and his co-authors. From the perspec-
tive of psychosis research at least, society and the lived
environment, in addition to work relating psycho-
logical concepts to neuroscience, are important theor-
etical drivers (Kapur, 2003 ; Selten & Cantor-Graae,
2005 ; Kirkbride et al. 2006 ; Morgan et al. 2008; van Os,
2009). Hence, we would suggest that, for the DSM to
be meaningful and important for clinicians and re-
searchers, it needs to reﬂect the belief that there is
no tension between an externalist understanding of
psychiatric disorders and the allegiance to a physical-
ist conception of the mental.
We should keep the psyche in psychiatry, and keep
mental disorders as mental.
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